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Abstract. We analyse three game-based definitions of receipt-freeness;
uncovering soundness issues with two of the definitions and completeness
issues with all three. Hence, two of the definitions are too weak, i.e.,
satisfiable by voting schemes that are not intuitively receipt-free. More
precisely, those schemes need not even satisfy ballot secrecy. Consequently,
the definitions are satisfiable by schemes that reveal how voters vote.
Moreover, we find that each definition is limited in scope. Beyond sound-
ness and completeness issues, we show that each definition captures a
different attacker model and we examine some of those differences.
1 Introduction
Electronic voting, or e-voting, is the process of voting with the use of electronic
aids at some stage in the voting process. We use the term e-voting to refer to
remote e-voting that does not require paper at any point in the process and can
be accomplished anywhere in the world. E-voting is gaining popularity, both for
public office elections and other voting scenarios. In particular, Australia has
used iVote [19] for state general elections in New South Wales since 2011 and
Estonia has implemented Internet voting in municipal elections since 2005 and in
parliamentary elections since 2007 [35]. Moreover, the International Association
for Cryptologic Research (IACR) use Helios [1, 17] to elect board members [18].
E-voting has created new opportunities, including the introduction of conve-
nience to the voting process, and the potential to automate the process of tallying
elections when compared to hand-counting ballots in a traditional paper-based
election. It also has the potential to produce verifiable elections, one of the main
security goals of e-voting.1 E-voting also creates new challenges. In particular,
voter privacy is a concern. This is not new or unique to electronic voting but is
particularly true for schemes that do not rely on a physical voting booth because
1 Verifiability is typically defined as individual verifiability (any voter can check that
their ballot is counted), universal verifiability (anyone can check that the published
tally is correct) and eligibility verifiability (only eligible voters voted). The interested
reader can consult [11, 31, 34] for a discussion on the subject of verifiability.
the voter cannot rely upon the privacy afforded by the booth. A step towards
overcoming the challenge of ensuring voter privacy is to provide rigorous privacy
definitions for e-voting schemes, and then formally prove that a scheme satisfies
a given definition.
Privacy for e-voting is often presented as a hierarchy of security properties [13]
as follows. First, ballot secrecy, whereby a voter’s vote remains secret throughout
the election, except when the result of the election reveals the vote, or when
partial information about the vote can be deduced from the result. Second,
receipt-freeness, the property that a voter cannot prove their vote to anyone.
Finally, coercion-resistance, whereby a voter can cast their vote as they intended,
even if they are under the control of an attacker for some time during the election.
The relationship between these privacy properties is often considered to be
linear [13]. In particular, receipt-freeness strengthens ballot secrecy with additional
protection against vote buying. This ensures that potential attackers have no
incentive to buy votes, since a voter cannot prove how they voted, and therefore
cannot prove that their vote was truly ‘bought’. Moreover, coercion-resistance
strengthens receipt-freeness by protecting against randomization, abstention and
simulation attacks [22]. However, Ku¨esters et al. challenge this hierarchy, showing
that increasing the level of ballot secrecy can lead to a decrease in the level of
coercion-resistance [24].
Formal ballot secrecy definitions were surveyed in [5, 29], where Bernhard et
al. and Smyth compared existing ballot secrecy definitions from the literature
and presented their own definitions. Similarly, definitions of coercion resistance
were surveyed in [32]. Receipt-freeness, on the other hand, has not been surveyed,
which motivates this work.
The earliest definitions of receipt-freeness are informal, with the first definition
credited to Benaloh and Tuinstra [4]. A general shift towards formal definitions
occurred in response to concerns that voting schemes may appear to be receipt-
free when they are not [28]. The early formal definitions, with the exception of
Moran and Naor’s simulation-based definition [27], are formulated in the symbolic
model, for example, [2, 8, 14, 15, 20, 21]. These definitions use a variety of logical
languages to capture the intuition of receipt-freeness. In fact, these definitions
helped to shape the intuition and determine how to define receipt-freeness. More
recently, there has been a movement towards game-based definitions of receipt-
freeness, possibly driven by the simplicity of proof techniques in the model. Given
that this is a young area of research and, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no examination that tests the rigour of these game-based definitions, we revisit
existing game-based definitions in the literature and perform a critical analysis.
1.1 Our contributions
We analyse three game-based definitions of receipt-freeness from the literature:
a receipt-freeness definition by Kiayias et al., which we call KZZ [23] (§3); one
by Chaidos et al., which we call CCFG [9] (§4); and one by Bernhard et al. for
schemes that use deniable vote updating, a process that allows a voter to change
their vote without detection, which we call DKV [6, 7] (§5). We cast each definition
into our syntax (Definition 1) to facilitate analysis and comparison of definitions.
We uncover soundness issues with KZZ and CCFG, and find all three definitions
to be incomplete. The soundness issue in KZZ arises because the definition is
satisfied by schemes that reveal how voters vote when not all voters vote (§3.1).
An issue arises in CCFG because Chaidos et al. do not consider strong consistency
(§4.1), a property defined to accompany ballot secrecy definition BPRIV [5], upon
which CCFG is based, and is used to detect some attacks against ballot secrecy.
The definitions are incomplete because some schemes are out of scope. Schemes
that count votes in some particular ways and others that allow voters to submit
multiple ballots are out of scope of KZZ (§3.2). We prove that neither KZZ nor
CCFG is satisfiable by JCJ [22] (§3.2,4.2). Finally, DKV limits the class of schemes
considered to those that use deniable vote updating.
We discuss the attacker model adopted by each definition, showing that each
definition considers a different attacker model. We find that KZZ models a voter
that attempts to prove their vote to an attacker, without allowing the voter
to interact with the attacker before voting. In particular, the attacker cannot
provide instructions to the voter (§3.3). We demonstrate that the attacker model
in CCFG is much stronger, capturing an attacker with some control over the voter
(§4.3). We also comment that DKV does not model a voter who attempts to prove
their vote, but only asks whether an attacker can determine whether a voter has
updated their vote from the attacker’s choice or not. We discuss the consequences
of these differing attacker models, questioning whether each definition captures
the core intuition of receipt-freeness.
2 Preliminaries
We let A(y1, . . . , yn; c) denote the output of algorithm A on inputs y1, . . . , yn
and coins c, and let A(y1, . . . , yn) denote A(y1, . . . , yn; c) for some coins c chosen
uniformly at random. Moreover, we let x←M denote assignment of M to x.
An e-voting scheme typically consists of the following five phases. First (Setup),
the election administrator2 computes and publishes public parameters of the
scheme. Secondly (Register), the administrator provides eligible voters with a
public and private credential and adds the public credential to a list L. Thirdly
(Vote), each voter selects their vote v. This vote is stored as a ballot b on the
ballot box BB. Fourthly (Tally), a tallier computes and publishes the result.
Finally (Verification), voters verify that their ballot is on the ballot box and
observers verify that the tally is correct. We now formally introduce the syntax
for an e-voting scheme, adapted from [5, 9], that follows this structure.
Definition 1 (E-voting scheme). An e-voting scheme Γ is a tuple of prob-
abilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Setup,Register,Vote,Append,Tally,Verify)
relative to a result function f : V→ R where V is the set of all possible votes and
R is the result space such that:
2 For simplicity, we consider each entity to be a single individual but the role of any
individual can be distributed.
Setup(1λ) On input security parameter 1λ, algorithm Setup outputs an election
key pair pk and sk, where pk is the public key and sk is the private key.
Register(1λ) On input security parameter 1λ, algorithm Register outputs a pub-
lic/private credential pair upk and usk and updates the list L with upk (i.e.
L ← L ∪ {upk}).
Vote(v, usk, pk, 1λ) On input vote v, private credential usk, public key pk and
security parameter 1λ, algorithm Vote outputs a ballot b.
Append(BB, b) On input ballot box BB and ballot b, algorithm Append updates
BB to include the ballot b and outputs the updated ballot box.
Tally(BB,L, sk, 1λ) On input ballot box BB, list L, private key sk and security
parameter 1λ, algorithm Tally computes the election outcome r, and outputs
r with a tallying proof ρ that the tally is correct.
Verify(BB, r, ρ, pk, 1λ) On input ballot box BB, election outcome r, proof ρ, public
key pk and security parameter 1λ, any interested party can check that the
outcome of the election was computed correctly. The output of algorithm Verify
is 1 if the election result verifies and 0 otherwise.
E-voting schemes must satisfy correctness: let f be a result function,3 mb be
the maximum number of ballots and mc be the maximum number of candi-
dates. We say that Γ satisfies correctness with respect to f , mb and mc if there
exists a negligible function negl such that, for all security parameters λ and
choices v1, . . . , vnv ∈ V where nv is an integer such that nv ≤ mb ∧ |V| ≤
mc, Pr
[
(pk, sk) ← Setup(1λ); for i = 1, . . . , nv:
{
(upki, uski) ← Register(1λ);
bi ← Vote(vi, uski, pk, 1λ); BB ← Append(BB, bi)
}
; L ← {upk1, . . . , upknv};
(r, ρ)← Tally(BB,L, sk, 1λ): r = f(v1, . . . , vnv )
]
> 1− negl(λ).
Our correctness definition uses ideas from the correctness definitions in [5, 34] and
considers an experiment in which the outcome is calculated in two ways: 1) the
outcome is calculated in the normal way by running Tally, and 2) the outcome is
computed by applying a result function f to all the votes input to Vote. Those
two ways must compute equivalent outcomes to satisfy the correctness property.
3 Receipt-freeness by Kiayias, Zacharias & Zhang (KZZ)
In this section, we analyse the receipt-freeness definition by Kiayias et al. [23],
which we call KZZ. The game captures the following idea: the attacker should be
unable to distinguish between a voter who submits a vote and either proves that
they submitted that vote, or attempts to prove that they submitted a different
vote.
Definition 2 (KZZ). Let Γ = (Setup,Register,Vote,Append,Tally,Verify) be an
e-voting scheme, A be an adversary, S be a simulator,4 λ be a security parameter,
nv, nc and t be positive integers and β be a bit. Let Exp
KZZ,β
A,S,Γ (λ, nv, nc, t) be the
game that proceed as follows:
3 Function f must itself be correct, i.e., f must output the election outcome with
respect to v1, . . . , vnv .
4 Simulator S models a voter providing fake evidence of a vote they did not submit.
1. The challenger initializes BB as an empty list and inputs 1λ, nv, nc to adver-
sary A, which outputs a set of eligible voters I = {id1, . . . , idnv} and a set
of possible vote choices V such that |V| = nc.
2. The challenger computes Setup(1λ) to produce the key pair (pk, sk) and,
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , nv}, computes Register(1λ) to produce a credential pair
(upk, usk). Public credentials are added to the list L, hence,
L = {upk1, . . . , upknv}. The challenger inputs pk and L to A.
3. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , nv}, A decides whether idi is corrupt.
– If so, the challenger inputs uski to A, which outputs a ballot b.
– Otherwise (idi is not corrupt), A outputs votes v0, v1 ∈ V to the chal-
lenger, the challenger computes ballot b ← Vote(vβ , uski, pk, 1λ), and the
challenger returns the ballot to A, along with either the view view of the
voter during Vote when β = 0 or S(view) when β = 1.5
Finally, the challenger computes BB ← Append(BB, b).
4. The challenger computes (r, ρ) ← Tally(BB,L, sk, 1λ) and inputs r, ρ and
BB to A, which outputs a bit β′.
5. The game outputs 1 if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) β′ = β, (ii)
the number of corrupted voters is bounded by t, and (iii) f(〈v0〉idi∈Vh) =
f(〈v1〉idi∈Vh), i.e., with respect to uncorrupted voters, denoted by the set Vh,
the outcome of the election computed via the result function f is the same,
regardless of whether β = 0 or β = 1.
An e-voting scheme Γ satisfies KZZ for nv voters, nc candidates and at most t
corrupted voters if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator S and a
negligible function negl such that, for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries
A and all security parameters λ, we have∣∣∣Pr [ExpKZZ,0A,S,Γ (λ, nc, nv, t) = 1]− Pr [ExpKZZ,1A,S,Γ (λ, nc, nv, t) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) .
We demonstrate a soundness issue with KZZ, namely, that KZZ guarantees receipt-
freeness only if all voters vote (§3.1). Moreover, KZZ is incomplete because there
exists schemes that are receipt-free but do no satisfy KZZ (§3.2).
3.1 Soundness issue
KZZ requires that a single ballot is submitted to the ballot box on behalf of each
voter. As a result, KZZ declares schemes as receipt-free that reveal how voters
vote, when not all voters vote. To illustrate this, consider an e-voting scheme
for at most nv voters. If less than nv voters vote and, hence, |BB| ≤ nv − 1,
define algorithm Tally to output an election outcome r = {(id1, v1), . . . (idi, vi)}
where i ≤ nv − 1, i.e., it lists each voter that voted and the vote submitted by
that voter. Clearly, this scheme is not receipt-free. Indeed, the scheme does not
5 view is defined as the “internal state of the voter” [23]. It refers to any information
that the voter inputs to the voting client to produce a ballot, including, but not
necessarily limited to, private credentials and the coins input to algorithm Vote.
satisfy ballot-secrecy because the result announces the link between voter and
vote. However, in the KZZ game, a ballot must be submitted for every voter, so
this privacy leakage will not be identified. Therefore, the scheme may satisfy KZZ
whilst not being receipt-free. Consequently, a proven secure scheme may leak
every voter’s vote when a real-world deployment cannot ensure that all voters
vote. Hence, there may exist schemes that are proven secure but, in practice, do
not offer any degree of privacy for voters.
3.2 Completeness issues
Schemes with multiple ballots are out of scope: KZZ requires the submis-
sion of a single ballot on behalf of each voter. Yet, some e-voting schemes require
the submission of more than one ballot to achieve receipt-freeness. For instance,
e-voting schemes may use fake private credentials (that are indistinguishable
from real private credentials). Such schemes require voters to cast dummy ballots
using fake credentials and prove the contents of dummy ballots (rather than real
ballots) to an attacker. A voter can then cast a ballot for a different vote using
their real credential. In these schemes it is necessary that a voter submits two
ballots in order to submit a vote but prove that they submitted a different vote.
JCJ [22] is an e-voting scheme that achieves receipt-freeness this way, hence, the
scheme cannot satisfy KZZ. We obtain the following result, a proof of which
appears in the full version of this paper [16].
Proposition 1. JCJ does not satisfy KZZ.
KZZ limits the set of result functions for which a scheme can be de-
clared receipt-free: We demonstrate this limitation, which exists as a conse-
quence of the condition f(〈v0〉idi∈Vh) = f(〈v1〉idi∈Vh), by considering an informal
argument used by Bernhard et al. in [5] to show that ballot-secrecy definition
PRIV [3] has the same limitation. Consider an e-voting scheme with two pos-
sible candidate choices, namely V = {0, 1}, for which f outputs the winning
candidate, or ‘0’ in the event of a draw. An adversary against the KZZ game
can submit a ballot for ‘1’ on behalf of a corrupted voter and can submit votes
on behalf of all other voters such that 〈v0〉idi∈Vh has exactly half entries equal
to ‘0’ and half equal to ‘1’, and 〈v1〉idi∈Vh has all entries equal to ‘0’. Then,
f(〈v0〉idi∈Vh) = f(〈v1〉idi∈Vh) = 0, but the election outcome r = 1 (if β = 0) or
0 (if β = 1). Thus, the adversary can output β′ = β and the scheme does not
satisfy KZZ.
3.3 Further discussion
KZZ models attack scenarios in which a voter provides evidence of their vote
(including their private credential) to the attacker only after voting, thereby
assuming that honest voters do not reveal their private credentials until they
have voted. We illustrate that DEMOS, an e-voting scheme that satisfies KZZ [23,
Theorem 5], is no longer receipt-free if an attacker can compel a voter to reveal
their credentials before voting, that is, when the assumption does not hold.
DEMOS provides each eligible voter with a voting card (which is a private
credential in our terminology). This voting card consists of two parts: the first
part contains a list of candidates and a unique vote code associated with each
candidate. This is repeated on the second part of the voting card, although the
vote codes associated with each candidate are different. To cast a ballot, each
voter selects a part of their voting card (part ‘0’ or part ‘1’, which we call the
coins, using our terminology) and inputs the selected part and the vote code listed
next to their chosen candidate to the voting client. The part of the voting card
and the vote code constitute the voter’s ballot. The ballot box is updated with
the ballot, i.e., algorithm Append outputs BB ‖ b. Intuitively, DEMOS satisfies
KZZ because voters can swap vote codes on the voting card, and can make the
vote code on their ballot correspond to any candidate they wish. Therefore, the
voter can convince the attacker that the submitted vote code corresponds to the
attacker’s choice of candidate.
However, consider the following scenario: an attacker wants a voter to vote for
candidate A but the voter wants to vote for candidate B. The attacker requests
to see the voter’s voting card before voting. Only after seeing the voting card, the
attacker requests that the voter cast a ballot for A. In this scenario, the voter
may not have switched vote codes for A and B. Thus, the voter cannot vote for
A and convince the attacker that they voted for B. In contrast, if an attacker
does not see the voting card until after voting, the voter can switch the vote
codes for A and B. Therefore, DEMOS provides a guarantee of receipt-freeness
only if the voting card is revealed after voting.
The scenario above describes an attacker who interacts with a voter before
voting, which is outside the scope of KZZ. The question is: should this attack
scenario be captured by receipt-freeness, or does it fall under the remit of coercion-
resistance? We do not address this in our informal definition of receipt-freeness
(§1) because this is a grey area in the literature. For instance, Delaune et al.
define receipt-freeness as the property that “a voter does not gain any information
(a receipt) which can be used to prove to a coercer that she voted in a certain
way” and coercion-resistance as “a voter cannot cooperate with a coercer to
prove to him that she voted in a certain way” [14]. This suggests that providing
information to an attacker before voting is captured by coercion-resistance, not
receipt-freeness. In fact, Delaune et al.’s definition of receipt-freeness implies
that a voter uses information to prove their vote after voting, whereas providing
information to an attacker before voting is considered cooperation with an attacker.
It appears that KZZ captures this intuition. On the other hand, some authors take
a different approach. We discuss an approach that leads to a different conclusion
in §4. For now, we note that establishing a boundary between receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance is an open problem.
4 Receipt-freeness by Chaidos et al. (CCFG)
In this section, we consider a definition of receipt-freeness by Chaidos et al. [9],
which we call CCFG. Chaidos et al. consider ballot boxes that contain ballots
validated by an algorithm Valid and consider ballot boxes as private, introducing
an algorithm Publish that outputs a public view of a ballot box, which we call
the bulletin board. Formally, Chaidos et al. extend the definition of an e-voting
scheme (Definition 1) to include algorithms Valid and Publish such that:
Valid(BB, b) On input ballot box BB and a ballot b, algorithm Valid outputs >,
if the ballot is valid, or ⊥ otherwise.
Publish(BB) On input ballot box BB, algorithm Publish outputs bulletin board
PBB.
Furthermore, algorithm Verify is redefined to take as input a bulletin board PBB,
rather than a ballot box BB. All other aspects of Verify remain the same.6
In this context, Chaidos et al. define CCFG as an extension of the ballot
secrecy game BPRIV by Bernhard et al. [5]. CCFG captures the idea that the
attacker should be unable to determine whether, throughout the game, they are
viewing a real or fake election, when the outcome is always computed for the real
election. As such, CCFG models two ballot boxes, BB0 and BB1, and, respectively,
two bulletin boards, PBB0 and PBB1. The adversary must determine whether
they are viewing PBB0 or PBB1, when the outcome is always computed over
the contents of BB0.
CCFG relies on algorithms SimSetup and SimProof, which facilitate the ability
to simulate the tallying proof ρ such that the outcome computed over the contents
of BB0 appears to be computed over the contents of BB1, when β = 1. Algorithms
SimSetup and SimProof are defined as follows:
SimSetup(1λ) On input security parameter 1λ, algorithm SimSetup outputs an
election key pair pk and sk and auxiliary information aux, which is used to
output a simulated proof during the tally phase of the election.
SimProof(BB, r, aux) On input ballot box BB, election outcome r and auxiliary
information aux, algorithm SimProof outputs a proof ρ that r is the outcome
of an election computed over the contents of BB.
Using those algorithms, CCFG is formalized as follows:
Definition 3 (CCFG). Let Γ = (Setup,Register,Vote,Valid,Append,Tally,
Publish,Verify) be an e-voting scheme, A be an adversary, λ be a security param-
eter and β be a bit. Let ExpCCFG,βA,Γ (λ) be the game that proceeds as follows:
7 the
challenger initializes BB0 and BB1 as empty lists and Vr and Vc as empty sets.
Adversary A can then query the oracles defined in Figure 1, under the constraint
that Osetup must be queried before any other oracles and Otally appears only as
6 In this section, we use the term e-voting scheme to refer to Definition 1 plus algorithms
Valid and Publish.
7 We omit SimSetup and SimProof as inputs to game ExpCCFG,βA,Γ (λ) for simplicity.
the final oracle call. The adversary terminates by outputting a bit β′. The game
outputs 1 if β′ = β.
An e-voting scheme Γ satisfies CCFG if there exists algorithms SimSetup and
SimProof and a negligible function negl such that, for all probabilistic polynomial-
time adversaries A and all security parameters λ, we have∣∣∣Pr [ExpCCFG,0A,Γ (λ) = 1]− Pr [ExpCCFG,1A,Γ (λ) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) .
We show that CCFG is unsound as it overlooks the needs for strong consistency
(§4.1) and is incomplete, limiting the class of schemes that can be declared
receipt-free (§4.2).
4.1 Soundness issue
A property called strong consistency is introduced in [5] to accompany BPRIV.
Strong consistency requires that the outcome output by Tally is consistent with
the application of result function f to the votes and is necessary to detect tally
policies that may lead to an attack against ballot secrecy. Therefore, as noted in
[5, Section IV.D], an e-voting scheme must satisfy BPRIV and strong consistency
to achieve ballot secrecy. However, Chaidos et al. do not consider this property
in [9], which results in an unsound definition of receipt-freeness. In fact, there
exists schemes satisfying CCFG that are vulnerable to attacks that violate ballot
secrecy. We briefly recall an example in [5, Section IV.D], that illustrates this:
define an e-voting scheme for two candidates (say, A and B) that outputs a
multiset of the submitted votes as the election outcome. Suppose this scheme
satisfies CCFG. Now, define a modified scheme such that, if the first voter votes
for candidate A, this vote is removed from the election outcome. An adversary
against CCFG cannot distinguish games ExpCCFG,0A,Γ (λ) and Exp
CCFG,1
A,Γ (λ), where Γ
is the modified scheme, because the tally is always computed over the contents
of BB0 and so the election outcome will be the same in both games. However,
through removal of the first vote, the tally for this modified scheme allows the
adversary to determine whether the first vote is for candidate A or B. Therefore,
the modified scheme reveals how the first voter voted. We refer the reader to
[5, Section IV.D] for full details of this argument. Unfortunately, CCFG cannot
simply adopt the original definition of strong consistency by Bernhard et al.,
because it is defined over different syntax. In particular, the original definition
does not consider consider algorithm Append. Adapting the original definition to
consider this algorithm is a possible direction for future work.
4.2 Completeness issue
We observe that CCFG is unsatisfiable by schemes for which Append(BB, b)
outputs BB ‖ b and Publish(BB) outputs BB. That is, Append(BB, b) ap-
pends ballot b to ballot box BB without processing the ballot in any way and
Publish(BB) outputs BB such that the ballot that appears on the public view
of BB is identical to the ballot submitted by the voter. Formally, we have the
following result.
Osetup()
if β = 0 then
(pk, sk)← Setup(1λ)
else
(pk, sk, aux)← SimSetup(1λ)
return pk
Oregister(id)
if (id, upk, usk) /∈ Vr then
(upk, usk)← Register(1λ)
L ← L ∪ {upk}
Vr ← Vr ∪ {(id, upk, usk)}
return upk
Ocorrupt(id)
if (id, upk, usk) ∈ Vr then
Vc ← Vc ∪ {(id, upk)}
return (upk, usk)
Ovote(id, v0, v1)
if v0, v1 ∈ V ∧ (id, upk, usk) ∈ Vr then
b0 ← Vote(v0, usk, pk, 1λ)
b1 ← Vote(v1, usk, pk, 1λ)
BB0 ← Append(BB0, b0)
BB1 ← Append(BB1, b1)
Ocast(id, b)
if Valid(BBβ , b) = > then
BB0 ← Append(BB0, b)
BB1 ← Append(BB1, b)
Otally()
if β = 0 then
(r, ρ)← Tally(BB0,L, sk, 1λ)
else
(r, ρ′)← Tally(BB0,L, sk, 1λ)





if (id, upk) ∈ Vc ∧ Valid(BB0, b0) = > ∧ Valid(BB1, b1) = > then
BB0 ← Append(BB0, b0)
BB1 ← Append(BB1, b1)
Fig. 1. Oracles used in the receipt-freeness game CCFG by Chaidos et al. [9]
Proposition 2. Let Γ = (Setup,Register,Vote,Valid,Append,Tally,Publish,
Verify) be an e-voting scheme for which Append(BB, b) outputs BB ‖ b and
Publish(BB) outputs BB. Then Γ does not satisfy CCFG.
Proof. We construct an adversary A against the CCFG game as follows. A queries
pk ← Osetup(), upk ← Oregister(id) and (upk, usk) ← Ocorrupt(id). Then, A
computes b0 ← Vote(v0, usk, pk, 1λ) and b1 ← Vote(v1, usk, pk, 1λ) and queries
Oreceipt(id, b0, b1), PBBβ ← Oboard() and (r, ρ) ← Otally(). It follows that
PBBβ contains the single entry b0 (if β = 0) or b1 (if β = 1). Therefore, A can
correctly distinguish ExpCCFG,0A,Γ (λ) and Exp
CCFG,1
A,Γ (λ) and outputs β
′ = β. Thus,
the e-voting scheme Γ does not satisfy CCFG. uunionsq
CCFG is unsatisfiable by these schemes because, in the CCFG game, the
adversary submits two ballots to Oreceipt. To satisfy CCFG, the adversary must
be unable to distinguish a bulletin board that contains ballot b0 and a bulletin
board that contains ballot b1, where the adversary queries Oreceipt(id, b0, b1)
in the CCFG game. This requires that ballots are modified in some way before
they are appended to BB0 and BB1, or before PBBβ is published. Otherwise,
the adversary can trivially distinguish as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.
Partly, CCFG excludes these schemes by design. Chaidos et al. acknowledge that
a scheme satisfies CCFG only if it achieves receipt-freeness without the voter
relying on some evasion strategy [9]. Generally, schemes that provide voters with
an evasion strategy, a procedure that the scheme provides to allow the voter to
evade coercion, do not rely on ballot modification but instead on the use of an
evasion strategy to achieve receipt-freeness. This means that schemes that rely
on evasion strategies to achieve receipt-freeness cannot satisfy CCFG despite the
fact that they are receipt-free. For example, JCJ relies on fake credentials, a type
of evasion strategy, to achieve receipt-freeness (§3.2). Thus, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. JCJ does not satisfy CCFG.
The corollary follows from Proposition 2, since JCJ ballots are not modified
before they are appended to the ballot box and Publish(BB) outputs BB.
4.3 Further discussion
CCFG captures the scenario in which an honest voter constructs their ballot and
gives the attacker the coins used (or possibly uses coins provided by the attacker)
to construct their ballot. This allows the attacker to reconstruct the ballot
locally and then check whether the ballot appears on the bulletin board. CCFG
captures this scenario through the oracle Oreceipt, which allows the adversary to
construct ballots on behalf of voters and then submit these ballots to Oreceipt.
The adversary can then view PBBβ , and expects to see a ballot corresponding
to one of those submitted to Oreceipt.
Chaidos et al. take a very different approach to the intuition of receipt-freeness
than Kiayias et al. As mentioned in §3.3, Delaune et al. consider a voter that
cooperates with an attacker (e.g. by using coins provided by the attacker) to
fall outwith the scope of receipt-freeness. Moreover, Kiayias et al. exclude this
scenario from the definition of KZZ. However, Chaidos et al. consider this to
fall within the scope of receipt-freeness although, admittedly, they do refer to
CCFG as a definition of strong receipt-freeness. Therefore, we see that there is no
consensus over the boundary between receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance in
the literature and that definitions of receipt-freeness capture varying intuitions.
5 Receipt-freeness for deniable vote updating by
Bernhard, Kulyk & Volkamer (DKV)
In this section, we analyse a definition of receipt-freeness by Bernhard et al. [6,
7] for schemes that use deniable vote updating, which we call DKV. Bernhard et
al. construct a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for KTV-Helios [25], a
variant of the Helios e-voting scheme that uses deniable vote updating whereby a
voter casts a ballot, and then changes their vote, without an attacker detecting
the change. In [7, Section 4.1] it was recognized that CCFG does not apply to
KTV-Helios because deniable vote updating is a type of evasion strategy and
the strategy is required to achieve receipt-freeness. Therefore, Bernhard et al.
introduce a new receipt-freeness definition that modifies CCFG to schemes that use
deniable vote updating. We rely on the definition presented in [6] (the technical
report associated with the conference version of the paper [7]).
DKV captures the following idea: the attacker should be unable to distinguish
a voter who submits a vote and a voter who submits the same vote but then
deniably updates their vote, where the adversarial advantage of distinguishing is
denoted δ. DKV adopts e-voting syntax (Definition 1) extended with algorithm
Valid (§4) and considers timestamps such that algorithm Vote is redefined to take
additional input of a timestamp t, indicating the time at which a ballot is to
be cast. DKV relies on algorithms SimSetup and SimProof (§4) and, additionally,
algorithms DenyUpdate and Obfuscate such that:
DenyUpdate(v0, v1, usk, tu, pk, 1
λ) On input votes v0, v1, private credential usk,
timestamp tu chosen uniformly at random from some probability distribution
P, public key pk and security parameter 1λ, algorithm DenyUpdate outputs
a ballot that updates a vote from vote v0 to vote v1 at timestamp tu.
Obfuscate(BB, id) On input ballot box BB and voter id, algorithm Obfuscate
casts dummy ballots for voter id to hide ballots cast by id in the event that
id deniably updates their vote, and outputs the updated ballot box.
Using those algorithms, DKV is formalized as follows:
Definition 4 (DKV). Let Γ = (Setup,Register,Vote,Valid,Append,Tally,Verify)
be an e-voting scheme with timestamps, A be an adversary, λ be a security
parameter and β be a bit. Let ExpDKV,βA,Γ (λ) be the game that proceeds as fol-
lows: the challenger initializes BB0 and BB1 as empty lists. If β = 0 (resp.,
β = 1), the challenger computes Setup(1λ) to produce the keypair (pk, sk) (resp.,
computes SimSetup(1λ) to produce the keypair (pk, sk) and auxiliary informa-
tion aux) and, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , nv}, computes Register(1λ) to produce a
credential pair (upk, usk). Public credentials are added to the list L, namely,
L = {usk1, . . . , usknv}. The challenger inputs pk, L and BBβ8 to adversary A.
Adversary A can then query the oracles defined in Figure 2, under the constraint
8 In this game BB = PBB. Bernhard et al. do not mention adversarial access to BBβ
in the technical report [6] but do allow the adversary to ‘see’ BB in the conference
version [7]. We assume that, as DKV is a modification of CCFG, the adversary should
Ovote(id, v0, v1, t)
b0 ← Vote(v0, usk, t, pk, 1λ)
b1 ← Vote(v1, usk, t, pk, 1λ)
if Valid(BBβ , bβ) = > then
BB0 ← Append(BB0, b0)
BB1 ← Append(BB1, b1)
Otally()
if β = 0
(r, ρ)← Tally(BB0,L, sk, 1λ)
else
(r, ρ′)← Tally(BB0,L, sk, 1λ)
ρ← SimProof(BB1, r, aux)
return (r, ρ)
Ocast(id, b)
if Valid(BBβ , b) then
BB0 ← Append(BB0, b)
BB1 ← Append(BB1, b)
Oreceipt(id, v0, v1, t)
if v0, v1 ∈ V then
b0 ← Vote(v0, usk, t, pk, 1λ)
BB0 ← Append(BB0, b0)
BB1 ← Append(BB1, b0)
tu ←$ P
b1 ← DeniablyUpdate(v0, v1, usk, tu, pk, 1λ)
BB1 ← Append(BB1, b1)
BB0 ← Obfuscate(BB0, id)
BB1 ← Obfuscate(BB1, id)
Fig. 2. Oracles used in the receipt-freeness game DKV by Bernhard et al. [6]
that Oreceipt can be queried at most once and Otally appears only as the final
oracle call. The adversary terminates by outputting a bit β′. The game outputs 1
if β′ = β.
An e-voting scheme Γ satisfies DKV if there exists algorithms DenyUpdate,
Obfuscate, SimSetup and SimProof and a negligible function negl such that, for
all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A and all security parameters λ, we
have ∣∣∣Pr [ExpDKV,0A,Γ (λ) = 1]− Pr [ExpDKV,1A,Γ (λ) = 1]− δ∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) .
We did not find any soundness issues with DKV. In particular, although DKV
uses the same framework as CCFG, DKV does not overlook the need for strong
consistency and defines strong consistency in their syntax in [6]. Clearly, DKV is
incomplete because it limits the class of e-voting schemes that can be declared
receipt-free to schemes with timestamps that achieve receipt-freeness through
the use of deniable vote updating, although this is by design.
Bernhard et al. capture a different intuition of receipt-freeness than Kiayias
et al. and Chaidos et al. DKV does not model a voter who interacts with an
have access to BBβ . This could be resolved by providing the adversary with access
to an oracle Opublish as defined for CCFG. This provides the adversary with a view
of BBβ , which we assume is the intention in this definition.
attacker to prove their vote. In other words, DKV does not model a voter that
provides an attacker with any proof of their vote. In particular, there is no
mechanism to capture the fact that a voter may try to pass their credentials
or coins to an attacker. Certainly, this definition does not pose any issues with
respect to whether it captures attack scenarios that should be considered under
the heading of coercion-resistance. However, it does raise questions about whether
this definition captures receipt-freeness. As there is no mechanism for a voter
to attempt to prove their vote, we conclude that receipt-freeness is guaranteed
under the assumption that the voter does not pass any proof of their vote to the
attacker.
6 Conclusion
We have systematically analysed game-based definitions of receipt-freeness, uncov-
ered completeness and soundness issues, and found that each definition considers
a different attacker model.
We proved that KZZ can be satisfied by schemes that leak every voter’s vote.
Moreover, we found that CCFG does not consider strong consistency, which seems
necessary for soundness. By comparison, DKV considers strong consistency, and
we believe coupling CCFG with a suitable notion of strong consistency should
suffice to achieve soundness, albeit defining such a notion is non-trivial.
We found each definition to be incomplete. KZZ requires that each voter votes,
and only once. CCFG is unsatisfiable by a class of schemes that do not process
ballots before adding them to the ballot box and for which the bulletin board
is identical to the ballot box. Consequently, JCJ does not satisfy KZZ or CCFG.
Furthermore, DKV only applies to schemes that use deniable vote updating. Thus,
there is no game-based definition of receipt-freeness that can be applied to a
wide class of schemes.
Each definition captures a different attacker model: KZZ models a voter that
provides evidence of their vote (e.g., coins and credentials) after voting. By
comparison, CCFG captures scenarios wherein the voter uses coins provided by an
attacker. Consequently, KZZ does not capture scenarios where a voter interacts
with an attacker before voting (e.g., by providing the attacker with credentials),
whereas CCFG does. It is unclear whether a definition of receipt-freeness should
capture this scenario, or whether this should be considered beyond the scope of
receipt-freeness and be captured by coercion-resistance. The boundary between
receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance is unclear and we believe establishing a
boundary is an interesting open problem.
We observe that KZZ, CCFG and DKV consider that all election authorities are
honest, in particular, the election administrator, tallier and ballot box are honest.
Moreover, communication channels between voters and/or election authorities
are considered to be private. In practice, trust assumptions may be difficult to
enforce, or it may not be possible to prove that the assumption holds. Motivated
by this, ballot secrecy in the context of a malicious ballot box was considered in
[29, 30], whereby the adversary controls the contents of the ballot box. We believe
that this setting warrants further exploration and that security definitions with
minimal trust assumptions are preferable.
A further point of interest is that receipt-freeness (and, more generally,
privacy) does not exist in a vacuum and must be considered in the context of
other desirable security properties. This has been addressed in recent literature
and one notable area of research relates to the relationship between privacy and
verifiability. Some results have shown that this relationship is rather intricate:
for example, receipt-freeness and universal verifiability are incompatible under
certain assumptions on the communication channels and election authorities [10],
but are compatible under different assumptions [9, 26]. Moreover, Cortier and
Lallemand recently showed that ballot secrecy implies individual verifiability [12],
assuming the same trust assumptions for both ballot secrecy and individual
verifiability, but this result does not hold more generally [33]. We believe that
exploring the relationship between privacy and verifiability, particularly with
respect to trust assumptions, is an interesting area of future research.
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